The political drama unfolding in Burkina Faso feels ripped from the headlines. The expulsion of French troops, the pivot to Russia, the fiery speeches by Captain Ibrahim Traoré at global forums–it is a powerful spectacle of a young military leader defying the old -world order. But to see this only as anti-French rhetoric or a simple geopolitical shift is to miss the deeper, more profound revolution at play.
Traoré’s project is a unique blend of intellectual rebellion and moral reawakening. It is a strategic effort to reclaim national sovereignty not just through political defiance, but by using a political theory from the 20th century, a regional alliance, and a religious moral framework. It is a compelling, and at times, contradictory new blueprint for the state in a volatile region.
Unplugging from the System: The ‘Delinking’ Playbook
Traoré’s economic vision could be described in terms of ‘delinking”, a powerful idea from the late Egyptian-French economist Samir Amin. Simply put, Amin argued that genuine independence for Africa would never happen as long as its economies remained tightly plugged into a global system that was rigged against them. He saw the world as a place where the wealth of the Global North depended on the exploitation of the South. For countries like Burkina Faso, this meant perpetually being a supplier of cheap raw materials like gold and cotton, a reality that has kept them poor and dependent.
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Traoré has put this theory into practice in stark and visible ways. The first was to delink from Western security: the expulsion of French troops was not merely a political gesture but a response to widespread perceptions that the existing security partnership was failing to protect Burkinabè communities from an intensifying armed insurgency that draws on Islamist rhetoric. This symbolic act declared that the nation’s security would no longer be managed from Paris but from Ouagadougou. It was quickly followed by a pivot towards Russia, a move that, while welcomed by some domestic audiences as a sign of reclaimed sovereignty, has been controversial among Western governments and regional observers who view it as deepening dependence on another external power.
The second part of the delinking playbook is a broader policy platform centred on economic sovereignty. In recent months, Traoré’s government has been aggressively renegotiating gold mining contracts with multinational corporations. This is not just about getting a better price; it is a direct attempt to seize control of the nation’s most valuable asset and ensure that more of its wealth remains in the country. In his public speeches, he has linked this to a broader call for food sovereignty, urging Burkinabè citizens to rely on their own agriculture, not foreign aid. This is a powerful, tangible translation of Amin’s ideas, turning a theoretical concept into a national imperative for survival.
Finally, the push for the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) alongside Mali and Niger is a direct fulfilment of Amin’s call for collective self-reliance. He believed that no single African nation could succeed alone against the global system. The AES, born out of shared challenges and a common frustration with foreign powers, is a concrete attempt to forge a new regional bloc–a mini-coalition of the willing–that can negotiate, trade, and defend itself on its own terms.
Faith and a New Kind of Statecraft
What makes Traoré’s project unique, however, is that it goes beyond economic theory. It mobilizes Islam as a powerful, indigenous source of legitimacy and moral authority. When Traoré speaks, he often invokes what he calls ‘real Islam’, and he means something very specific. This is not a push for a full-blown Islamic state, and it is a world away from the programmes of the armed Islamist groups operating in the country. These groups typically justify their actions by framing the Burkinabè state as illegitimate, portraying their struggle as a form of jihad to establish governance under their interpretation of Islamic law. They recruit by promising justice, protection, or livelihood to marginalised rural populations who feel abandoned by the state, condemning Western influence and local elites as corrupt and un-Islamic. By contrast, Traoré redefines Islam not as a revolutionary alternative to the state but as a civic ethic–discipline, solidarity, and the defence of the homeland–that strengthens rather than dismantles national sovereignty.
Instead, Traoré frames ‘real Islam’ as a set of civic virtues: self-discipline, communal solidarity, and a moral duty to defend the homeland. This is a subtle yet profound act of statecraft. In a country where armed Islamist groups such as ISIS and JNIM use religious rhetoric to recruit and justify violence, Traoré is countering them by reclaiming the narrative. He is telling his people that their patriotism, their work in the fields, and their defence of their villages are themselves acts of faith. At the same time, this strategy carries risks. While around two-thirds of Burkinabè are Muslim, about a quarter are Christian and others follow traditional religions. For these minorities, Islamic state rhetoric may feel exclusionary. Earlier leaders like Thomas Sankara promoted a more secular, pluralist vision; Traoré instead presents religion as a civic glue. Whether this unifies or alienates remains uncertain.
The most visible sign of this is the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), the civilian militia that is now a centrepiece of the nation’s security strategy. When Traoré encourages citizens to join, he frames it not just as a national duty but as a moral and religious obligation. This approach taps into a long-standing Sahelian tradition where Islam has historically functioned as a civic infrastructure, providing a moral framework for community life. In doing so, he is attempting to re-root the state in a local, ethical tradition rather than a foreign, secular one.
This strategy is a masterful political move. In a region where trust in imported political institutions is low, Traoré is grounding his project in a powerful, shared cultural and religious identity. Both he and insurgent militias draw on Islam, but in very different ways. Groups like JNIM invoke jihad to delegitimise the state and justify violence against civilians, seeking to replace existing institutions with their own rule. Traoré instead frames Islam as civic duty–work, solidarity, and national defence become acts of faith that strengthen the state rather than dismantle it. This is what makes his project so compelling and, for some, so dangerous–it treats faith as a direct resource for building state authority.
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A New Chapter for African Sovereignty?
By bringing together Samir Amin’s critique of dependency, the push for regional solidarity, and a strategic use of Islam as a civic ethos, Traoré is offering a new kind of postcolonial project. It is a rebellion against the idea that a state’s legitimacy must be measured by its adherence to Western models of governance and development.
His vision of sovereignty is not just about having a national flag and a seat at the UN. It is about reclaiming control over the nation’s resources, its security, and its moral and intellectual foundations. He is saying that true independence is not merely political; it is economic, cultural, and spiritual.
Whether this audacious plan can truly overcome the immense structural challenges facing Burkina Faso–from persistent insecurity to deep poverty–remains to be seen. But what is undeniable is that Captain Traoré has ignited a conversation that goes far beyond the daily news cycle. He has revived powerful intellectual and moral traditions to forge a new path, one that forces us to reconsider what sovereignty truly means in the 21st century.
Sumna Sadaqat is a researcher and writer whose work examines the intersections of religion, politics, gender and postcolonial thought. Her research engages with questions of sovereignty, decoloniality, and the role of Islam as both a moral and political resource in contemporary societies. She is particularly interested in how alternative political imaginaries challenge dominant Western frameworks and open space for new ways of thinking about statehood, belonging, and community.
Read the original of this report, including embedded links and illustrations, on the African Arguments site.
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Better animal waste management and local intelligence can slow the smuggling and manufacture of explosives by violent extremists.
Boko Haram factions are increasingly using dung to disguise improvised explosive devices (IEDs), in particular landmines, and boost their ignition. These landmines are similar to conventional antipersonnel landmines – not in their shape and composition – but in their tactical use and mode of activation.
Nigerian army senior staff told researchers from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) that animal excrement had been used to prevent the detection of IEDs in several parts of northeast Nigeria, including Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states.
Several humanitarian sources and state officials confirmed the increased use of livestock waste by Boko Haram factions Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).
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Compressed dung was also used as a direct component in some IEDs across the three states. Once compacted, dung and other organic waste generate methane, which is highly explosive when mixed with air.
Security personnel said an electric wire helped ignite the compressed waste, sparking the main charge. The free and abundant availability of dung, together with its lack of control and traceability, makes it a preferred IED component compared to more controlled industrial fertilisers and other chemicals.
Although there is no data on what proportion of IED attacks in northeast Nigeria involve animal waste, the extent and impact of these attacks on civilians especially are clear. Government sources told the ISS that 613 IED casualties (injuries and deaths) were recorded in northeastern Nigeria from January to September 2024. In the same period, the United Nations Mine Action Service said it recorded 571 casualties, with civilians making up 65% of the victims.
This deadly trend has also been observed by ACLED (see graph below) and the Landmine Monitor, which showed that in the decade from 2011 to 2021, 1 387 casualties were recorded, compared to 1 487 in just three years from 2022 to 2024.
In addition to causing physical harm to victims, improvised landmines disrupt food production and intercity crop and livestock commerce – the primary sources of income for people in the region. Due to explosives, farm land has become largely inaccessible in Adamawa, Yobe and Borno, and transporting the limited harvest to trading zones has become perilous.
Many farmers have been forced to relocate to safer areas, where they have had to rebuild their livelihoods and social networks. As far back as 2016, many internally displaced persons were unable to return to their farms due to a fear of landmines. This was confirmed by United Nations Mine Action Service experts, who told ISS that in 2024 over 200 000 people had been displaced across the three states.
Displacements due to IEDs disrupt people’s lifestyles and means of income. In resettlement areas, newcomers could access only small plots of land for subsistence farming. This shift proved especially difficult for people who once cultivated hectares and lived off crop sales.
Besides farming, other essential services like schooling, healthcare and administration have also been compromised by improvised landmines, particularly in rural areas where people’s mobility is restricted.
The clearance of IEDs is slow in northeast Nigeria due to the lack of extensive demining programmes, like those in Senegal, Chad and Ukraine, and the use of inefficient traditional tools, like handheld metal detectors. Although Nigeria recently acquired drones for IED detection, they are used purely for military operations.
Addressing the use of biological waste in spreading and manufacturing IEDs is a complex endeavour. Dung in particular is abundant and weakly managed, especially in rural areas. Its use for multiple purposes – fertiliser, biogas, construction and as a tactical weapon – complicates control and regulation.
A holistic approach is needed that combines well-considered biological waste management systems in rural and peri-urban areas, with community-based intelligence to apprehend those using dung for IED-related purposes.
A first step for Nigeria’s state authorities could be to take a census of small-scale livestock farmers, who are the insurgents’ primary supply source according to humanitarian and security personnel. A centralised information system would enable better tracking and community outreach.
A second step is to promote energy production using dung. This involves processing the waste to capture the biogas (mainly methane) released, and storing it in tanks to be used as fuel for heating, cooking and electricity production.
Third is to upskill rural households on biogas, composting and vermiculture. This would enable a circular economy, with livestock farmers as raw material providers and populations as buyers/consumers, promoting transformation and reuse.
Income generated through the local circular economy could incentivise communities to develop a value chain around dung, making it available only for positive uses. Successful examples are in Rwanda, India, China and the Netherlands. Rwanda values dung based on a model promoting smart manure collection and biogas for institutions such as schools and prisons.
India has implemented a similar project focused on installing biogas digesters powered by ruminants, particularly cow dung, in rural areas. China and the Netherlands incentivise farmers to produce gas and bio-fertilisers with dung, enabling income and energy sources for rural populations.
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Nigeria seems inspired by these successes, given that a study on ‘waste-to-wealth’ strategies in the northeast has uncovered small-scale projects aiming to transform livestock and slaughterhouse waste into biogas and fertiliser.
Research in 2009 showed that Nigeria’s potential to produce biogas amounted to 6.8 million cubic metres a day based on an estimated 227.5 tonnes generated daily. But the study said implementation was constrained due to low awareness and financing challenges – both of which can be solved if state authorities decide to act.
Projects such as these could build positive relations between the government and the public, which is crucial for disrupting the activities of violent extremists. Reinforcing ties with local populations and maintaining databases on livestock farmers could also provide valuable local intelligence and prevent insurgents’ misuse of dung.
Controlling animal waste alone wouldn’t end the IED threat – but could help prevent the spread of this low-cost and deadly method of manufacturing explosives
Moussa Soumahoro, Researcher, Africa Peace and Security Governance, ISS Addis Ababa
Read the original article on ISS.
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The global burden of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) and mental health conditions represents far more than a health and well-being challenge. The alarming figures – 43 million NCD-related deaths each year and one billion people living with mental health conditions worldwide – underscore the profound economic, equity and development implications of one of the most pressing global health issues of our time.
Heart disease, stroke, cancer, diabetes, chronic lung disease and other NCDs take and devastate countless lives, but also hinder human and economic development, drain billions from economies, and put the most vulnerable at disproportionate risk. The major modifiable risk factors for NCDs – tobacco and alcohol use, physical inactivity, unhealthy diets and air pollution – are driven by socioeconomic, environmental or commercial determinants of health. Our income, social status, or level of education, the environment which we are born and live in, as well as our ability to access and afford care, all influence effective NCD prevention, management and treatment services.
A crucial step to advancing sustainable development
As many of the root causes and consequences of NCDs lie outside the traditional domain of public health, effective governance and policy-making must be multisectoral, engaging finance, trade, social affairs, economic development, treasury, technology, education and other relevant government sectors.
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The forthcoming political declaration of the Fourth High-Level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on the prevention and control of noncommunicable diseases and the promotion of mental health and well-being recognizes that health is both a precondition for, and an outcome of, sustainable development as a whole. Across all its commitments, it calls upon countries to have operational, multisectoral, and integrated policies or action plans on noncommunicable diseases and mental health in place by 2030.
However, implementing multisectoral governance and developing coherent policies remains a practical challenge for many countries. Institutionalizing cross-sectoral governance and a “whole-of-government” approach with clear accountability, fostering leadership, leveraging interdisciplinary data and evidence, and reframing NCDs beyond a mere health issue often prove complex, costly, or difficult to sustain over time.
Still, countries are demonstrating promising progress in effectively formalizing, informing and promoting multisectoral action.
Incentivizing and sustaining multisectoral governance
Effective multisectoral collaboration builds on joint governance and accountability among different government sectors and public agencies, leadership at all levels, a culture of interdisciplinary communication and collaboration, as well as dedicated human and financial resources. As much as possible, these strategic pillars of multisectoral governance and action should be formalized through presidential orders or municipal bills, high-level cross-sectoral committees or working groups, dedicated workstreams and meetings, or targeted financing and budgeting.
In Finland, for example, an Advisory Board for Public Health convenes the Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry, Finance, Education and Culture, Employment and the Economy, Environment, Interior, Justice, Social Affairs and Health, and Transport and Communications. Through several national initiatives, the Advisory Board has improved decision-making on complex issues such as the negative impact of obesity on the working capacity of the population.
In Tanzania, the multisectoral National NCD Programme under the leadership of the Prime Minister’s Office includes a yearly multi-sectoral steering meeting and is supported by a network of dedicated focal persons specializing in health in all policies in multiple government agencies.
Leveraging multistakeholder data- and knowledge-sharing
Multisectoral NCD policies and programmes must draw and integrate diverse data sources, different types of evidence and interdisciplinary expertise, including from actors beyond the health sector, and include people living with NCDs, mental health and neurological conditions in the design and implementation of these policies.
The production, exchange and application of multisectoral evidence can be supported through multistakeholder collaboration whilst ensuring clear lines of measurable accountability for implementation. Governments should leverage the expertise of academia, communities, civil society and people living with NCDs, mental health and neurological conditions to ensure their meaningful engagement in NCD initiatives.
In Canada, for example, the Quality of Life Framework effectively combines health data with economic, social, governance, and environmental indicators to measure well-being and to inform federal budgeting processes and reporting.
In the small municipality of Paipa in Colombia, a digital information system helps policy-makers and public health specialists to monitor the health status of urban and rural communities, combining data on social, economic, housing, environmental and health needs in a single municipal system that informs multisectoral policies and programmes.
Reframing the NCD narrative
Formalizing multisectoral governance and leveraging interdisciplinary evidence also help reframe the narrative of NCDs as a pressing and increasing socio-economic, environmental, and development endeavor.
There are multiple strategies to address this communication challenge: emphasizing the co-benefits of multisectoral action – including economic gains, social equity, and environmental impact – and stressing the unsustainable costs of inaction and the devastating impact of health inequities; or anchoring NCD prevention and control in people’s right to health, the need for universal health coverage, or integrated primary health care. Strong, multisectoral narratives on NCDs are key to mobilizing different stakeholders, and a powerful means for building trust, and reducing siloed structures and competing priorities.
In Sri Lanka, for example, an educational initiative for the prevention of cardiovascular diseases and diabetes framed education as a tool for prevention, a long-term investment in human capital and a cross-sectoral responsibility, rather than just a health or education issue. Through the resulting multisectoral school health, screening and health promotion programme, this multisectoral initiative achieved a lasting, positive impact on tackling challenges of unhealthy diets, obesity and physical inactivity.
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In the Philippines, a campaign to promote physical activity was reframed as an initiative for active transport and open spaces, presenting a health concern as a challenge for transport and urban planning. Since the programme’s inception in 2021, more than 500 km of bicycle lanes were built or improved in the Metropolitan areas of Manila, Davao, and Cebu as part as part of the Active Transport programme.
Key steps to advancing multisectoral governance and action on NCDs
In support of the global commitment by Member States to multisectoral collaboration in the forthcoming political declaration, governments, in collaboration with civil society and relevant partners, can advance cross-sectoral NCD policies and programmes in three key areas:

1. institutionalize multisectoral governance with clear and transparent accountability, coherent NCD policies and joint action as sustainable and resilient government mechanisms, financing mechanisms, or national priority initiatives;
2. strengthen coherent multisectoral data governance and evidence frameworks that include standardized, interoperable data collection systems and leverage expertise from diverse communities and people with lived experience; and
3. reshape the predominant NCD narratives to highlight the co-benefits of multisectoral action and emphasize shared roles and accountability across sectors and actors.

About the series
This commentary is part of a series highlighting priority areas to accelerate progress in the global NCD and mental health response and address related global health equity challenges ahead of the Fourth High-Level Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (UNHLM4) in 2025.
Discover the full series
Read the original article on WHO.
AllAfrica publishes around 500 reports a day from more than 110 news organizations and over 500 other institutions and individuals, representing a diversity of positions on every topic. We publish news and views ranging from vigorous opponents of governments to government publications and spokespersons. Publishers named above each report are responsible for their own content, which AllAfrica does not have the legal right to edit or correct.
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