The Sudan War series is a joint collaboration between the Center for Economic, Legal, and Social Studies and Documentation – Khartoum (CEDEJ-K), Sudan-Norway Academic Cooperation (SNAC) and African Arguments – Debating Ideas. Through a number of themes that explore the intersections of war, displacement, identities and capital, Sudanese researchers, many of whom are themselves displaced, highlight their own experiences, the unique dynamisms within the larger communities affected by war, and readings of their possible futures.
Since the outbreak of the war in Sudan on April 15, 2023, over 1.2 million Sudanese fled to Egypt. They join approximately 4 million already residing there. This large presence can be attributed both to the geographical proximity of the two countries and to their longstanding historical ties. Over the years, relations between Egypt and Sudan have shifted between periods of close governmental alignment and episodes of tension, affecting cross-border mobility and the treatment of Sudanese in Egypt Eventually, in 2004, the Four Freedoms Agreement was established, guaranteeing freedom of movement, residence, work, and property ownership for citizens of both countries. Following the outbreak of the conflict in Sudan, however, the situation deteriorated dramatically. Egypt gradually tightened entry requirements, which complicated residency procedures and introduced new obstacles for Sudanese seeking to register new businesses. Moreover, the newly arriving Sudanese find themselves in a stringent environment marked by excessive controls on their daily life practices including livelihoods. The economic crises and inflation they left behind coupled with the collapse of the banking system and the devaluation of the Sudanese pound against the Egyptian pound due to the war has placed a further strain on their financial capacities.
Once in Egypt, most Sudanese settled in Cairo and Alexandria. In Cairo, although they dispersed across several neighbourhoods, Faysal – a central neighbourhood situated on the west bank of the Nile opposite the city centre, part of Giza governorate – witnessed a particularly large influx of Sudanese following the recent outbreak of war. This increase was largely due to the presence of an established Sudanese community prior to the conflict, the ease of renting apartments owned by Sudanese landlords, and the affordable rents. However, the increase in demand for housing has since the war pushed up rental prices. Faysal is characterized by its social diversity, central location and diverse migrant community, mainly Sudanese, Yemenis, and Syrians. Among these new arrivals, some have established businesses such as restaurants, cafés, grocery shops and beauty salons, while others have managed to set themselves as brokers mediating in between these business as means of income. Due to the high concentration of Sudanese residents and shops in Faysal, many describe the area as evoking a strong sense of “being in Sudan”. The area’s significance in the Sudanese popular imagination has grown so much that Faysal appears in Zanig[1] songs and is mentioned by the Sudanese diaspora in Europe when discussing Cairo.
This piece explores how the recently displaced Sudanese in Faysal navigate the realities of displacement and the uncertain environment in which they find themselves. Through an overview of their livelihood practices in a highly volatile context, the piece contributes to the global debate on displacement survivalist strategies.
Informality: chameleon attitudes in a hostile environment
Numerous Sudanese run businesses have emerged in Faysal, primarily attracting Sudanese customers. These shops often small (employing no more than two or three workers) and family run offer Sudanese products such as spices, oils, cosmetics, food items, household utensils and incense (bakhour) while some also provide beauty-care services. Most of these businesses function informally, operating outside the tax system. This status serves the business in an otherwise restrictive environment. It also allows business owners to operate in accordance with market environment of Egypt as well as of the displaced communities while remaining low-profile. Egypt’s informal economy is widespread, accounting for approximately 40% of GDP and between 45% and 70% of jobs and is believed particularly prevalent some neighbourhoods such as Faysal.
Since the onset of the war in Sudan, regulations concerning entry, residency, investment and economic activities have changed rapidly. For a restricted Sudanese community, registering a business now poses serious hurdles. The process increases in complexity as time passes. For example, one such hurdle is that entrepreneurs must deposit a sizable sum into a designated bank account and obtain security check[2]. Indeed, Sudanese recognised as refugees by the UNHCR are excluded from the banking system. In the context of war, the extreme tightening of Egypt’s entry requirements has forced many Sudanese to cross the border illegally via desert routes, compelling them to apply for refugee status upon arrival or remain as an irregular for extended periods. Even those who hold visas to be renewed every few months – mainly those who arrived in the first weeks of the war, when it was still possible to obtain an entry visa, find it exceedingly challenging to open bank accounts. Moreover, these rules have changed multiple times in the past two years and often in an opaque way, making it very difficult for a struggling community to adapt. Finally, strict controls and restrictions on both the amount of money transferred into bank accounts (for those who manage to open one), and on cash brought into Egypt have driven many Sudanese not to try to open a bank account and move into the informal sector.
The informality of these businesses and the precarious administrative status of Sudanese in Egypt reinforced their vulnerability, exposing them to sudden shop closures, demands for bribes, or even the risk of expulsion from the host country.
Transnational capital networks
The challenging environment in Egypt compounded by the ongoing war in Sudan compels many displaced Sudanese to rely on primary solidarity networks for survival. As the war period prolonged, funding of small-scale economic activities became the preferred model of support instead of handouts. In Egypt, “Baladi market” which is a shorthand term for lower-class micro -and small-scale enterprises[3] lacks access to essential inputs such as bank credit. Stringent state regulations make it extremely difficult for those without significant financial or political capital to access funding. While some community-based organizations (CBOs), in partnership with UNHCR, provide help for refugees to start a business by offering training workshops and small grants, these amounts are typically quite modest[4] and awareness of such programs remains limited among recent displaced Sudanese. In this context, the strong family ties that characterize Sudanese society, as well as the solidarity forged through neighboorhoods, local communities, ethnic affiliations, and the nafeer system نفىر, a cultural tradition mobilizing collective emergency reponses; become an even more vital sources of support for displaced Sudanese.
Against this backdrop, the role of the Sudanese diaspora – especially those in Gulf countries, the United States, and Europe, has grown significantly. The war has impoverished many Sudanese, forcing them to leave behind or lose a substantial portion of their assets during displacement. Additionally, the ongoing devaluation of Sudanese currency since the start of the conflict has further reduced their resources, compelling them to seek alternative financial avenues, notably from diaspora relatives.
Pre-war networks are also an important resource for displaced Sudanese. Businessmen who had established cross-border commercial activities before the war (notably between Sudan, Egypt and Chad) were able, after the war, to draw on these networks and knowledge to import products from Sudan or Chad to stock their shops in Egypt. These networks are also crucial for securing housing, whether for residential or commercial use. Those who had connections to Sudanese individuals or family who owned property in Faysal prior to the war found themselves a distinct advantage.
“Inventing income”: brokering as a resource
Navigating within Faysal to secure sources of income also take the form of brokering various activities. This means that one would serve as an intermediary from which they would benefit financially and gain social capital. These in between facilitatory activities flourished due to the lack of formal employment opportunities in Egypt. Two types of brokering activities are particularly prevalent among Sudanese displaced in Faysal.
In the real estate domain, many Sudanese operate informally as “simsar”, a term that literally means “intermediary” but in the Egyptian context it refers to agents in the housing market. Typically, a Sudanese or an Egyptian property owner circulates information within his network about an apartment available for rent or sale. A simsar – one with an extended network and the owner’s trust – then coordinates with a network of brokers who connect potential tenants or buyers with the property. The profits of these transactions are shared throughout the network with those lower in the hierarchy receiving only a small portion. The widespread involvement of Sudanese in this activity is linked to the large numbers of displaced individuals in need of accommodation and other services in an unfamiliar context. Moreover, developments in the war in Sudan have had a direct impact on this market. For example, when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured Wad Madani in December 2023, it triggered a massive influx of Sudanese in precarious conditions arriving through illegal routes and in urgent need of housing – often in Faysal where family networks exist. This surge not only increased the number of Sudanese simsars, but also drove up rent prices drastically, sometimes even doubling them within six months.
A second widely developed brokering activity is currency exchange combined with money transfers[5]. Many individuals, sometimes operating within shops, offer money transfer services between Egypt and Sudan via digital application linked to the Bank of Khartoum, which is widely used by Sudanese people. These transfers provide a source of income for the brokers and a critical lifeline for customers in light of the collapse of Sudan’s banking system and the widespread financial informality of Sudanese in Egypt. Beyond these financial benefits, these activities also serve as an important means of building social capital and earning recognition within the Sudanese community.
Navigating local power structures
Social navigation and economic survival strategies for the Sudanese in Faysal often involve interactions through local agents who act as intermediaries navigating different layers of authority, both formal and informal.
As Sudanese entrepreneurs are subject to frequent controls by government authorities such as registrations checks, tax and revenue reviews, ensuring sanitary standards are maintained, and monitoring origin of the products, business management utilises a number of mechanisms to address possible penalties. Business owners who are not able to meet the requirements might delay fines and foreclosure by engaging in the wide spread practice of (baksheesh), a common phenomenon among Sha’abi businesses.
Thus, there is a continuous process of negotiation and dialogue between Sudanese entrepreneurs, brokers and the agents who control the district whether they are official of not. These interactions are often mediated through financial and social capital.
Conclusion
Within a rapidly shifting context and uncertain future, flexibility becomes a crucial survival strategy for Sudanese displaced in Egypt. As regulations, security conditions, and economic context transform quickly[6], they continually adapt their practices of earning a living and navigating the challenging context as well as creating spaces for social interactions. Under conditions of forced displacement and economic duress, the market reconstitutes social relations by creating winners and losers. On one hand, Sudanese with social connections or economic capital prior to the war were able to leverage these assets to gain financial benefits–such as in the real estate sector–and achieve social recognition. On the other hand, those lacking such resources often face disempowerment, impoverishment, and increased vulnerability. Consequently, a hierarchy of power emerges, shaped by pre- and existing networks and capital, and everyday market interactions. Moreover, the dense urban environment of Faysal, coupled with an authoritarian state which hardened its policy towards Sudanese nationals compels them to adhere to implicit social rules and engage with a range of agents–official and unofficial. Forced to be extremely vigilant, they navigate a web of both formal and informal regulations, and multilayered forms of controls.
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EndNotes
[1] Zanig is a music style of synth-driven music with techno-style repetition. This form of underground music became popular in 2010’s, especially among young urban Sudanese and gradually acquired a political dimension, with lyrics critical of power and expressing a rejection of the dominant cultural norms imposed by the official arts and culture promoted by the state.
[2] This security check is neither mandatory for all foreign nationals nor for every type of company. It represents a recent extension of control measures aimed at regulating foreign investment and economic activity. For example, in 2017-2018, it was applied only to certain sectors established by Syrians; after the outbreak of the war in Sudan in 2023, Sudanese investors initially did not face this requirement. Officially, the process is designed to ensure that new business owners are not engaging in money laundering–and, in the case of Syrians, to verify they have no ties to terrorist organizations.
[3] Amr Adly coined the term “baladi market”; see Amr Adly, Cleft Capitalism: The Social Origins of Failed Market Making in Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020), 54.
[4] The closure of USAID at the beginning of 2025 seems to have had a major impact on these aid programmes.
[5] At the beginning of 2024, the surge in the price of foreign currencies (dollars and euros) led to the development of a large black market in Egypt in which numerous Sudanese brokers were involved.
[6] At the time of writing, the context in Sudan is changing rapidly. By March 2025, the Armed forces seized Khartoum and several other regions, a move that, while not ending the war, has profoundly affected Sudanese in Cairo. Since late March, large buses have been leaving Faysal each day, carrying hundreds of people back to Sudan, and some residents have even turned their businesses into ad-hoc travel agencies to meet the demand (field observations, April-May-June 2025).
Debating Ideas reflects the values and editorial ethos of the African Arguments book series, publishing engaged, often radical, scholarship, original and activist writing from within the African continent and beyond. It offers debates and engagements, contexts and controversies, and reviews and responses flowing from the African Arguments books. It is edited and managed by the International African Institute, hosted at SOAS University of London, the owners of the book series of the same name.
Duaa Abuswar is a Khartoum University graduate in anthropology and sociology and an associate researcher at CEDEJ Khartoum. Marie Bassi is the coordinator of the Center for Economic, Legal, and Social Studies and Documentation (CEDEJ) Khartoum, and an associate professor of political science at the University Côte d’Azur in Nice, France.
Read the original of this report, including embedded links and illustrations, on the African Arguments site.
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