Francophone Africa and French military bases have been two critical foreign policy challenges for Nigeria since 1960. The administration of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa had to formulate exceptions to the principles of non-interference and non-intervention as provided for under Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter as a result.
The Article prohibits all forms of intervention in whatever falls under the domestic preserve of other sovereign nations. Nigeria is not averse to this provision but considered that under no circumstance should apartheid be considered the domestic preserve of South Africa, because Black people were subjected to brutalities, segregation, oppression and Nigeria could not be an onlooker. In the eyes of Nigeria, any form of indignity meted out to Africans and black people in the world is also an indignity meted out to every Nigerian who was therefore required to fight apartheid with every available means in his hands. This was why it was clearly stated in the inner back cover of the old Nigerian passport that the holder of the passport was obligated to fight apartheid with whatever means available to him or her.
In the same vein, when President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo was brutally assassinated during a foreign mercenary invasion reportedly sponsored by the French, Nigeria again said she could not be expected to fold her arms and not support a friendly Togo of President Olympio. Nigeria therefore formulated exceptions to apartheid and intervention of foreign mercenaries in Africa. Explained differently, Africa was made the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy, requiring the defence and protection of African and Black dignity the world over. The misunderstanding between Nigeria and France over France’s atomic bomb tests in the Reggane area of the Sahara in February, April and December 1960, which led to diplomatic rupture in January 1961, should be understood in this context. This is why France in Nigeria’s foreign policy calculations has always been a critical issue. It is against this background that Francophone Africa’s new attitude towards French military bases in their countries needs special investigation, especially from a polemological perspective.
French Military Bases at Bay
To begin with, why the hostility against French military bases at this material time? Is the termination of France’s defence pacts with Francophone Africa a re-strategy? If it is a re-strategy, who is the initiator? If the initiator is France, does it also mean that the ECOWAS the military junta are fighting is also being used by France to enable France to come back in a new guise? Is it an old wine in a new bottle? Are the protesting Francophone African countries truly mature and capable of self-reliance in the maintenance of their national security? Determination to be self-reliant is commendable but what about the means?
The supposed most reliable partners of France are declaring France non grata. After Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad have strained their military entente with France, it is now again the turn of the Côte d’Ivoire to slap France in the face. Is it a problem of France’s foreign policy miscalculation under President Emmanuel Macron? Is it a manifestation of Professor Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s theory of ‘every empire shall perish’?
At the level of Nigeria, can President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) manage the complexity of the new relationship between France and her former colonies in light of Nigeria’s existing foreign policy principles? If France and the Côte d’Ivoire of President Alassane Ouattara were reportedly instrumental to the election of PBAT as Chairman of the ECOWAS and the same President Ouattara is also reportedly now asking the French soldiers to quit, how do we explain the new anti-French virus? Is France encouraging the Francophone leaders to ask for withdrawal of her troops in order to enable France to come back in a smarter way?
This question is prompted by the fact that Chad, Niger, and the Côte d’Ivoire are notable reliable confidants of France. They are countries heavily relied upon by the West in the terrorism-containment efforts. If the countries are now, one after the other, asking the French to check out of their countries, what really are the polemological definienda? Are Nigeria’s foreign policy challenges not being made more complex, especially in light of the breaking news of PBAT’s official submission of the request for the extradition of Simon Ekpa, the pro-Biafran agitator, who proclaimed himself the Prime Minister of the United States of Biafran Government in Exile?
The quest for extradition of Simon Ekpa cannot but be another dimension of Francophone Africa’s emerging policy attitude towards Nigeria. Which Francophone country will or will not support a sovereign State of Biafra? What will be the new policy of France and the Côte d’Ivoire which gave political asylum to the Biafrans following the 1967-1970 civil war of national unity in Nigeria? To what extent can France still claim to be the representative of the NATO or the Western world in Africa? The deliberately kept cold rivalry between France and the United States or, put lato sensu, between the European Union and the United States, especially in terms of being the global centre of power and leadership of the world, cannot but be impacted upon in the making of or fighting the sovereign State of Biafra.
States have the potential to take side as there are pointers to a military strife between Nigeria and the Biafran soldiers in the foreseeable future. Simon Ekpa, the chief Biafra agitator in Finland is currently under detention. His deputy, Ngozi Orabueze, has reportedly placed an advert for the recruitment of Biafran soldiers, implying that the request for the extradition of Simon Ekpa to Nigeria may not be a quick end to the agitation of a State of Biafra. Besides, the detention of Nnamdi Kanu for long in Nigeria has not prevented his supporters from militating against the Tinubu government. The challenge here is determining what will happen if there is a real shooting war between Nigeria and Biafra again: will the war not prompt having a French military in support of either side? Will that not conflict with Nigeria’s foreign policy of no military base in Africa? Or should a foreign military base be accepted because it is about military hostilities?
Under General Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria’s Commissioner for External Affairs, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, made it clear that under no circumstance would Nigeria accept the use of Africa simply as a source of raw material for the development of Europe and to the detriment of Africa. Additionally, Nigeria vehemently opposed French military bases in Africa but France not only argued that she was in Africa by the kind invitation of other sovereign countries like Nigeria, but was also actively supported by Francophone Africa.
What is particularly noteworthy is the fact that when France carried out her atomic bomb tests before eventually continuing further tests in the Pacific, the Francophone African countries expressed much joy, and saw the success of the tests as a ‘French Community feat’. The French Community to which Francophone Africans belong on the basis of the principle of assimilation prompted unnecessary division of Africa on linguistic basis and destructive rivalry between the English and French speaking countries.
Without whiff of doubt, Africa is a major problem and challenge unto itself. By definition, Africa is geo-politically ambiguous. On the one hand, the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community divided Africa into five regions, contrarily to the UN classification of the whole of Africa as a region of the world. On the other hand, under each region, there are linguistic differentiations. For example, in the West African region, there are the Anglophone, Arabophone, Francophone, and Lusophone countries. When discussing Francophone Africa, some of them also have other affinities. Mauritania speaks French but still remains Arabophone, a major reason for opting out of the ECOWAS and preferring to join the Maghreb Union in the North Africa region.
When the foregoing issues are explicated in terms of downsizing military entente with France, it is clear that Nigeria’s foreign policy challenges cannot but become more complicated for various reasons: more theatres of conflict, increased funding of conflicts, deepened political instability, more agitations for self-determination which can take advantage of the deterioration of the conflict, etc. In sum, the complication cannot but begin with an extending environmental conditioning of insecurity and how Nigeria can constructively respond particularly to the new developments in Francophone Africa.
In this regard, by kicking out France, who is to fill the vacuum created? Are Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad now capable of playing France’s roles in the containment of the terrorists? Do they want to simply replace France with another foreign power? Are they really the ones asking for the withdrawal of French troops or it is France engaging in a back-door diplomacy to negotiate for withdrawal that will enable the opportunity of returning under a new renegotiated guise? Whatever is the case, the politics of the French withdrawal is quite interesting, the polemological definienda are more thought-provoking, and the implications for Nigeria have the potential to be more domestically destabilizing.
Polemological Definienda and Impact on Nigeria
The polemological definiendum is basically the discontentment with France in the conduct and management of strategic mineral resources of the aggrieved countries and the inability of France to contain the advancement of terrorism and killing of innocent civilians. The contents of each definiendum vary from one country to the other. Grosso modo, at the epicenter of the dispute is a conflict of national interests. France’s approach to the protection of her interests in the Sahel is not consistent with the approaches of the States in the Sahel.
As explained by Dr. Bakary Sambe, the Director of the Timbuktu Institute, West Africa is considered to be ‘a space of natural deployment and influence’ and that the more than 30 French direct military interventions in Africa between 1964 and 1995 were ‘to perpetuate and safeguard the stability and durability of certain regimes.’ Professor Bruno Charbonneau of the Royal Military College of Saint-Jean in Canada says ‘the French military presence in Africa has always allowed France to be at the heart of conflict resolution and management mechanisms in French-speaking Africa, particularly at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’.
Another causal factor for not only seeking to establish military bases in Africa, but also for people’s opposition to them, is to contain and prevent terrorism from being imported back home in Europe. It is against this background, for instance, that the RECAMP (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities Programme) was established in the late 1990s by France, the United Kingdom and the United States with the objective of training soldiers and boosting their capacities not only to combat the Al Qaeda and ISIL terrorists, but also to protect the land borders and the maritime territory.
Most unfortunately, this objective of enablement of security, first at the level of the Sahel and secondly back at the European level, has not been achieved. The non-achievement has been explained severally by anti-French protesters in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and the Côte d’Ivoire. In Mali, France is perceived as an obstacle to the political stability of the military junta who enjoyed the people’s support. France made it clear that she did not recognize the government of Mali which led to the declaration of the French ambassador unwanted. Besides, France’s Operation Serval only succeeded relatively while the Operation Barkhane which followed it failed woefully. Both Operations did not stop the jihadist terrorism of the Al Qaeda and the ISIL. French troops were therefore seen to be ineffective.
Besides, France was not happy with the Malian government’s rapprochement with Russia. France cannot see how she can be in any alliance with Russia in Mali. In the eyes of the Malian military junta, the decision of rapprochement with Russia is a matter of national sovereignty. In an attempt to avoid a situation of order and counter-order amounting to an encounter and disorder, the Malian government ordered the exit of the French troops.
Secondly, Burkina Faso, who put an end to the defence pact with France in January 2023, prefers to take the battle of security directly to the doorsteps of the terrorists by itself within the framework of its national sovereignty. The Burkinabé are much dissatisfied with the presence of the French military and had to engage in public protests against France, burning the French National Flag. As rightly revealed in an Inside Story discussion programme of Al Jazeera in which Alex Vines of the Chatham House, London, Niagale Bagayoko, and Ovigwe Eguegu participated, Bagayoko said the need for protection of national sovereignty which dates back to the time of Thomas Sankara was a major definiendum in the anti-French sentiments. She added that Operation Serval was more operational outside, rather than inside, of Burkina Faso. In fact, Burkina Faso before declaring the French soldiers unwanted, tried to diversify the country’s international partnerships, especially fraternizing with Russia for one reason that is not far-fetched: 40% of the Burkinabé territory is under the control of the ISIL and Al Qaeda, thousands of people had been killed while about 3 million Burkinabé had been internally displaced. This cannot but call for the withdrawal of French troops.
Third is Niger whose perception of French military presence undermines Niger’s sovereignty and an unnecessary recolonization in a new form. Like in Mali and Burkina Faso, anti-French sentiments are very stiff. Like in Mali, France did not recognize the Abdurahamane Tiani regime in Niger. Whereas the people are more concerned about France’s exploitation of their uranium resources without a reciprocal fair benefits for the people. This generated much political tension which has led to the declaration of French soldiers unwanted.
Fourth is Chad. The Chadian Foreign Minister, Abderaman Koulamallah, said France is ‘an essential partner’ who must admit that ‘Chad has grown up, matured and is a sovereign state that is very jealous of its sovereignty,’ meaning that the quest for sovereignty is one of the definienda for the call for withdrawal of French troops. As told by www.rfi.fr, France was given a deadline of six weeks, beginning from 20 December, 2024 and ending on 31 January, 2025 to withdraw France’s 1000 soldiers and their equipment. In the eyes of the French military, the deadline was a ‘pressure tactic from the hardline faction of Chad’s inner circle of power.’
Even though the Chadian government of Mahamat Idris Déby Itno said the withdrawal does not imply a breakdown in ties with France of Emmanuel Macron, there is no disputing the fact that Chad unilaterally broke the defence accord with France, probably as a result of the protracted long time of negotiations with France on the need to withdraw her troops. Apart from this, there are other four definienda making the withdrawal a desideratum. The deadline was also given at a time preparations for parliamentary and local elections were on. This means trying to satisfy the people’s anti-French sentiments.
There are also the issue of alleged France’s unsupportive policy for President Mahamat Itno, the reality of Chad being a landlocked country, being bordered by the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, and Niger all of which play host to paramilitary forces from Russia’s Africa Corps that replaced the Wagner mercenaries group in Africa. Chad appears to have considered the domino effect of the Alliance of Sahel States and the fear of not being left alone.
Fifth is Senegal where there are about 350 French soldiers. As reported by Chris Ewokor of the BBC News, on 31 December, 2024, Senegalese President Bassirou Dioumaye Faye ‘instructed the Minister for the Armed Forces to propose a new doctrine for cooperation in defence and security, involving among other consequences, the end of all foreign military presences in Senegal from 2025.’
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www.lemonde.fr reports further that the Senegalese president was elected largely because of his promise to make Senegal fully sovereign and because, on 28 November, 2024 he said in his address to the AFP that ‘Senegal is an independent country. It is a sovereign country and sovereignty does not accept the presence of military bases in a sovereign country.’ Similarly as noted by other countries, Senegalese president said his policy stand does not mean a rupture in Franco-Senegalese relations. As he put it, ‘France remains an important partner for Senegal for the investment for Senegal and the presence of French companies and even French citizens who are in Senegal.’ Thus the definiendum for the call for withdrawal is again basically the need for full sovereignty of Senegal.
Sixth and most recent is the case of Côte d’Ivoire who asked last Tuesday, 31 December, 2024 the French troops to leave the country and that the pull out would begin in January 2025. Is the decision negotiated or an ultimatum? It appears to be a negotiated one because of the nature of entente cordiale between the two countries.
Toussaint N’Gotta quoted Alassane Ouattara on January 1, 2025 as follows: ‘we have decided on the concerted and organized withdrawal of French forces in Ivory Coast.’ N’Gotta added that ‘the military infantry battalion of Port Bouét that is run by the French army will be handed over to Ivorian troops’ (vide AP News). The reason given is that Ivory Coast is modernizing its armed forces. Besides, at the economic policy level, Côte d’Ivoire is still much dependent on France in the use of the CFA franc which is pegged to the Euro and guaranteed by France, a situation that sustains recolonization in different ramifications.
The issue of unequal trade and resource exploitation to the detriment of the Ivoiriens is another definiendum. The people want France’s political interference to stop in the spirit of national sovereignty. They want to promote their cultural independence by reducing the dominance of French language. Indeed, the developments in the AES countries have their own impact on the younger generations in the country. This is why about 600 French troops are being kicked out of the Côte d’Ivoire. In the words of Alassane Ouattara, ‘we can be proud of our army, whose modernization is now effective. It is in this context that we have decided on the concerted and organized withdrawal of French forces’ from Ivory Coast.
In sum, what are the lessons from the various causal factors for declaring French soldiers and military bases non-grata? First, Nigeria’s foreign policy of 4-Ds, considered as a doctrine or diplomacy, cannot meaningfully resolve the definienda of why France is kicked out of five Francophone West and Central African regions. Second, of the many reasons given for declaring French troops non-grata, six of them are noteworthy: perception of French performance in the anti-Al Qaeda and ISIL terrorist war as unsatisfactory; Francophone people’s quest for the exercise of full sovereignty; belief of the people that France only takes them ‘as idiots;’ Alpha Blondy, the Ivoirian reggae star’s anthem that ‘French armies, Go Away,’ rendered in the 1990s; perpetuating and safeguarding the stability of some regimes friendly with France; use of Africa as means to sustain the middle-power status of France in international politics; and West Africa and the Sahel as a space for natural influence making. Put interrogatively, can Nigeria stop the people’s perceptions of France? Can Nigeria stop the people’s agitation for the right to full sovereignty? What can Nigeria do to stop France from seeking to safeguard the stability of regimes that are pro-France? Africa enables France to be an African power and a Power in Africa. What can Nigeria do about this? These are some of the challenges and implications for Nigeria’s foreign policy towards Africa. The diplomacy of 4-Ds has to be re-conceptualised to accommodate the new direction of Francophone Africa. A giant leader should not rest in the face of mounting challenges.
Read the original article on This Day.
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